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and Conflicting Decisions
1. Introduction
As a general rule, the arbitrator appointed to hear a given matter is required to disclose 
conflicts of interest to ensure the fairness and integrity of the process by rendering an objective 
and impartial decision.  Heretofore, a “rule of reasonableness” governed conflicts of interest 
disclosure, meaning that the arbitrator had a duty to use reasonable efforts to conduct a 
reasonable inquiry regarding conflicts of interest and to make disclosures to the parties regarding 
same.1  This was a relatively subjective standard that most certainly varied on a case-by-case / 
arbitrator-by-arbitrator basis, and is no longer the rule in California.
Until recently, private arbitration2 primarily involved repeat players who were familiar 
with the arbitration process, the provider organizations and sometimes the arbitrators 
themselves.3  As such, there were few cases concerning inappropriate arbitrator behavior4
1
   Stephen B. Goldberg, Frank E. A. Sander, Nancy H. Rogers, Sarah Rudolph Cole, Dispute Resolution / 
Negotiation, Mediation and Other Processes, (4th ed. 2003) (“ADR Text”), p. 279.
2
   Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution which is often used in lieu of traditional litigation.  It has 
been defined as “a usually (but not always) private process of adjudication in which parties in dispute with each 
other choose decision-makers (sometimes one, often a panel of three) and the rules of procedure, evidence, and 
decision by which their dispute will be decided.”  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related 
Dispute Resolution Processes:  What’s Happening and What’s Not, 56 Miami L. Rev. 949, 949 (2002) (“Menkel-
Meadow Article”).  The term “private arbitration” refers to the process whereby parties agree by contract to 
voluntarily submit their disputes for resolution by one or more impartial third persons instead of by a judicial 
tribunal provided by law.  Private arbitration “is a procedure for resolving disputes which arise from contract; it only 
comes into play when the parties to the dispute have agreed to submit to it.”  Herman Feil, Inc. v. Design Center of 
Los Angeles (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1406, 1414, 251 Cal.Rptr. 895; Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Miller (1998) 523 U.S. 
866, 876, 140 L.Ed.2d 1070, 118 S.Ct. 1761.  As compared to “judicial arbitration,” where certain types of civil 
cases can be diverted before trial to “judicial arbitration” under CCP § 1141.10, et seq., private arbitration is very 
different proceeding.  First of all, in judicial arbitration, there is no preexisting agreement by the parties to arbitrate 
their disputes.  Secondly, a judicial arbitration award is not binding on the parties; either may demand a trial de novo 
by judge or jury.  Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1141.20.  
3
   ADR Text, supra, p. 279.
4
   Id.
2because the “players” in that system were familiar with and in many respects self-regulated the 
process and its participants.
In September 2001, the California Legislature enacted SB 475 to address, among other 
things, disclosure of arbitrator conflicts of interest by imposing new regulations upon the private 
arbitration process and its neutrals.5  The new law significantly revised the disclosure 
requirements and procedures for disqualifying arbitrators in private arbitration matters, and went 
far beyond anything theretofore on the books regulating the private arbitration process.  The new 
law was believed to be necessary due to what the California Legislature perceived to be a lack of 
public confidence in private arbitration, which perception was at odds with the general purpose 
of arbitration law which is to “advance arbitration as an alternative to litigation.”6  That concern 
was prompted by the increased use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in various types of 
consumer and employment contracts, where the arbitration clauses are embedded in form 
contracts offered on a “take it or leave it basis,”7 thus making the selection of arbitration for 
dispute resolution an involuntary choice by the consumer party.  In consumer advocate circles, 
the concern was that the party requiring the pre-dispute arbitration clause as a condition to 
entering into a contractual relationship with another party had too much power because that party 
5
   The new disclosure requirements set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.9 and Standard 
7(d) of Division VI of the California Rules of Court are referred to in this paper as the “New Ethics Rules.”
6
   Roger Alford, Report to Law Revision Commission Regarding Recommendations for Changes to California 
Arbitration Law, 2003 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L. J. 1, 3 (2004) (“Alford Article”).  Arbitration is generally viewed as an 
attractive alternative to litigation because it affords parties “with an economical, efficient, confidential, and neutral 
forum to resolve their contractual disputes,” is generally “a faster means of resolving disputes than litigation,” and 
provides limited opportunity for judicial review.  Id., citing, David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, The Appropriate 
Resolution of Corporate Disputes:  A Report on the Growing Use of ADR by U.S. Corporations 17, 26 (1998). 
7
   “By requiring customers in adhesionary circumstances to go to a system established and controlled by industry,” 
the protection for legal rights and the legitimacy and traditional support for arbitration is imperiled.  As a result, the 
private arbitration process “no longer symbolizes the recourse to be bargained for, relatively rapid, efficient, 
knowledgeable, and fair alternative adjudication; rather, it epitomizes overreaching and the inaccessibility of 
justice.”  Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law, 40 Me. L. Rev. 263, 284 
(1988) (“Carbonneau Article”).
3could chose and impose the arbitration process, define the rules and even select the arbitral 
forum leading to the potential for unfair advantage over the other party.8  In short, the California 
Legislature thought that its intervention was necessary to even the playing field for consumers.9
Even though the impetus for the new standards was concern for unsophisticated or 
inexperienced consumers forced into arbitration with companies that were intimately familiar 
with the private arbitration process, the provider organizations and the arbitrators, the new 
disclosure rules apply to all private arbitrations conducted in California, not just consumer 
arbitrations, excepting only those arbitrations conducted pursuant to the terms of a public or 
private sector collective bargaining agreement.10
SB 475 has been the subject of controversy and debate since it was enacted and the 
Judicial Council was mandated to adopt disclosure and disqualification requirements that would 
apply to all neutral arbitrators.11  Controversy and criticism began on the “Blue Ribbon Panel of 
Experts on Arbitration Ethics” which the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court 
8
   See, Jay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics – Is California the Future? 18 Ohio S. J. on Disp. Resol. 343, 343-347 
(2003) (“Folberg Article”); see also, ADR Text, supra, Ch. 4.  “A series of articles published [in 2003] in the San 
Francisco Chronicle highlighted how arbitration provider organizations promoted the use of pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in which they were designated as arbitration providers.  Accusations were made about financial ties between 
provider organizations and repeat users of their services, suggesting favorable outcomes went to those users creating 
an inflow of cases.  The series featured consumer arbitration horror stories, which, along with indignant editorials, 
added to the sense of public outrage against ‘involuntary’ arbitration.”  Folberg Article, supra, at 344.
9
   “Ultimately, it is the absence of negotiation between employers or businesses on the one hand and employees or 
consumers on the other that causes arbitration critics to treat arbitration agreements with suspicion.  Unlike 
interactions in the collective bargaining context or among merchants (traditional arbitration users), where all parties 
are regular participants in negotiation and arbitration, only the employer, or big business, or health provider is a 
‘repeat player’ in disputes with employees, consumers, or patients.”  ADR Text, supra, at p. 242.
10
   This means that private arbitrators hearing disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements are not
required to comply with the New Ethics Rules even though they are private arbitrators acting within California.  
This is consistent with the long-standing recognition that disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements are 
governed by the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169) which, in 1935, established the National 
Labor Relations Board as an independent federal agency to administer the NLRA and implement the national labor 
policy of assuring free choice and encouraging collective bargaining as a means of maintaining industrial peace.  
See, National Labor Relations Board website, http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/default.asp.
11
   Folberg Article, supra, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. at 345.  
4appointed to assist the Judicial Council in its task,12 and started with the abbreviated time frame 
in which the new ethics standards were adopted which did not allow time for meaningful 
comment before the rules became effective.13  Importantly, although much of the criticism 
leading to the enactment of SB 475 was directed at the perceived conflicts of interest created by 
arbitration provider organizations and their repeat customers, the regulation of private 
organizations is not within the general authority of the Judicial Council,14 and so SB 475 focused 
on standards for arbitrators, generally, and not on the specific acts provider organizations could 
or could not do.15  Clearly, however, the regulation of private arbitrators has had an impact on 
the provider organizations with whom the arbitrators are associated.
It is not surprising to find that the controversy and debate concerning the standards for 
arbitration disclosures and disqualification has continued since the new ethics standards became 
effective on July 1, 2002.  Much of that debate has occurred in civil litigation cases filed in the 
state and federal courts of California.  This paper will survey some of the more significant 
decisions, examine their holdings, and discuss the uncertainty and other problems attendant to 
conducting a private arbitration in California.
2. California’s New Ethics Rules
In 1961, California adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act16 which provided for vacatur of 
a neutral arbitrator’s award based upon bias.17  However, as originally enacted, there were no 
12
   Id.
13
   Id. 
14
   Id.
15
   Id.  “This assignment created a new role for the [Judicial] Council in the regulation of private professional 
practice, and it raised questions about delegation to the judicial branch of a legislative function.”  Id.
16
   Codified at Title 9 of the California Code of Civil Procedure (Cal. C. Civ. Proc. §§ 1280, et seq.).
5specific disclosure requirements imposed upon neutral arbitrators.18  In 1994, California enacted 
Section 1281.9 of the California Code of Civil Procedure to require specific arbitrator 
disclosures.19  As originally enacted, the disclosure requirements under Section 1281.9 were 
relatively narrow, requiring only disclosure of information concerning arbitrations that involved 
the same parties or lawyers in the current arbitration where the arbitrator served or was currently 
serving as a neutral or party arbitrator.20  In 1997, Section 1281.9 was amended to expand those 
disclosure requirements to include any attorney-client relationship the arbitrator has or had with 
any party or lawyer and any professional or significant personal relationship the arbitrator, his or 
her spouse, or minor child living in the household has or had with any party or lawyer.21  In 
2001, SB 475 amended Section 1281.9 to further expand arbitrator disclosure requirements to 
include any ground specified for disqualification of judges under Section 170.1 of the California 
Code of Civil Procedure and any matters required to be disclosed by the ethics standards for 
neutral arbitrators adopted by the Judicial Council.22
The “judicial” disclosure requirements contained in Section 170.1 of the California Code 
of Civil Procedure describe six specific disclosure obligations and one catchall disclosure 
obligation.  Standard 7(d) of the New Ethics Rules details thirteen specific disclosure obligations 
17
   An arbitrator’s failure to disclose information indicative of bias constitutes grounds to vacate an award under 
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2(a)(1) (“award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue 
means”), or Section 1286.2(a)(2) (“corruption in any of the arbitrators”).  In this regard, it has long been the rule that 
a neutral arbitrator must disclose “dealings that might create an impression of possible bias,” and that the failure to 
do so constitutes misconduct and creates a ground to set aside the award.  Commonwealth Corp. v. Casualty Co.
(1968) 393 U.S. 145, 149, 89 S.Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 301; Ray Wilson Co. v. Anaheim Memorial Hospital Ass’n
(1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1087, 213 Cal.Rptr. 62.
18
   Alford Article, supra, p. 2.
19
   Stats. 1994, c. 1202 (S.B. 1638), § 1.
20
   Id. 
21
   Stats. 1997, c. 445 (A.B. 1093), § 2.
22
   Stats. 2001, c. 362 (S.B. 475), § 5.
6and one catchall disclosure obligation.  The seven disclosure obligations found in Section 170.1 
and the other disclosure requirements contained in Section 1281.9 are, for the most part, 
mirrored in Standard 7(d).23  Standard 7(d) then expands upon the “judicial” disclosure 
requirements to require disclosure of any “professional relationship” the arbitrator or a member 
of the arbitrator’s immediate family has had with a party or lawyer to the proceeding,24 of any 
“interest” that the arbitrator or a member of the arbitrator’s immediate family has that “could be 
substantially affected by the outcome of the arbitration,”25 and of membership in any 
organization that practices discrimination of any kind.26
Through SB 475 the disqualification procedures theretofore contained in Section 1281.9 
were moved to a new code section – Section 1281.91.  That section retained the provision for 
any party to disqualify a neutral arbitrator if he or she fails to make the disclosures required by 
Section 1281.9(a).27  It also retained the provision for any party to disqualify a neutral arbitrator 
23
   Standard 7(d)(12) and Section 170.1(a)(1) require disclosure if the judge / arbitrator has personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.  Standard 7(d)(7) and Section 170.1(a)(2) require disclosure if 
the judge / arbitrator has had an attorney-client relationship with any party or lawyer to the proceeding.  Standards 
7(d)(9) and (10) and Section 170.1(a)(3) require disclosure if the judge / arbitrator has a financial interest in the 
proceeding or a party to the proceeding.  Standard 7(d)(1) and Section 170.1(a)(4) require disclosure if the judge / 
arbitrator (or a member of his / her extended family) is a party to the proceeding or an officer, director or trustee of a 
party.  Standard 7(d)(2) and Section 170.1(a)(5) require disclosure if the judge / arbitrator (or a member of his / her 
extended family) is the spouse, former spouse, child, sibling or parent of a lawyer or spouse of a lawyer in the 
proceeding or if such person is associated in the private practice of law with a lawyer in the proceeding.  Standard 
7(d)(6) and Section 170.1(a)(8) require disclosure if the judge / arbitrator has a current arrangement for prospective 
employment or compensated service as a neutral or has had discussions for such prospective employment with a 
party to the proceeding.  Standard (d)(14) and Section 170.1(a)(6) require disclosure of any other matter that might 
cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt about the judge/s / arbitrator’s impartiality.
24
   CRC, Appendix, Div. VI, Std. 7(d)(8).
25
   CRC, Appendix, Div. VI, Std. 7(d)(11.
26
   CRC, Appendix, Div. VI, Std. 7(d)(13.
27
   Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.91(a).  Like its predecessor (Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.9(b)), Section 1281.91(a) entitles 
any party to serve a notice of disqualification within 15 days after the proposed nominee or appointee fails to 
comply.
7on the basis of the disclosures made.28  It likewise retained the provision for waiver of a party’s 
right to disqualify if the if timely notice of disqualification is not made.29
The significant change to the disqualification procedures is found in subsection (d) of 
Section 1281.91, which added a requirement that a neutral arbitrator must disqualify himself or 
herself upon demand of any party based upon disclosures made under Section 170.1 of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure.30  That new section works hand-in-hand with the vacatur 
provisions found in Section 1286.2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.  As amended in 
1993, Section 1286.2 allowed vacatur of an arbitration award if the arbitrator making the award 
was subject to disqualification upon grounds specified in Section 1281.9 but failed upon receipt 
of timely demand to disqualify himself or herself as required.31  As amended in 2001 by SB 475, 
the vacatur provisions were expanded to allow vacatur of an arbitration award if the arbitrator 
making the award failed to make timely disclosures.32  In adding this additional ground for 
vacatur, the California Legislature stated that the addition of this new subparagraph was intended 
to be “declarative of existing case law which provides that an arbitration award may be vacated 
when a neutral arbitrator fails to disclose a matter that might cause a reasonable person to 
question the ability of the arbitrator to conduct the arbitration proceeding impartially.”33
28
   Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.91(b)(1).  Like its predecessor (Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.9(c)(1)), Section 
1281.91(b)(1) entitles any party to serve a notice of disqualification within 15 days after receipt of the disclosures.
29
   Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.91(c).  Like its predecessor (Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.9(d)), Section 1281.91(c) 
provides that the right of a party to disqualify a proposed neutral arbitrator shall be waived if the party fails to timely 
serve the notice required by this section. 
30
   Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.91(d).  Interestingly, this new section was not written to require mandatory 
disqualification by the arbitrator  based upon disclosures made under the New Ethics Rules.
31
   Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1286.2(a)(f) (redesignated in 2001 as (a)(6) by SB 475).
32
   Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1286.2(a)(6)(A).
33
   Section 8 of Stats. 2001, c. 362 (SB 475).  See, e.g., Commonwealth, supra; Ray Wilson, supra, Reed v. Mutual 
Service Corp. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1359, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 524; Roitz v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage 
8SB 475 also added Section 1281.85 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which 
delegated authority to the Judicial Council to adopt mandatory ethical standards for all 
individuals serving as neutral arbitrators in contractual arbitrations held in California and 
instructed that the Judicial Council do so by July 1, 2002.34  Pursuant to this mandate, in April 
2002 the Judicial Council adopted the “Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual 
Arbitration”.35  Along with the statutory amendments created by SB 475, the new arbitrator 
ethics rules became effective on July 1, 2002 and apply to any person “serving as a neutral 
arbitrator pursuant to an arbitration agreement.”36
The authority to disqualify an arbitrator based upon his or her failure to make conflict 
disclosures or the disclosures themselves has been vested with the parties since Section 1281.9 
was first enacted in 1994.37  Those disqualification procedures and rights are now codified at 
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.91(a) and (b)(1).  Section 1281.91, enacted 
pursuant to SB 475, goes further and now imposes an affirmative duty on the part of the neutral 
arbitrator to disqualify himself or herself if any disclosures are made under the “judicial” 
disclosure requirements which are now applicable to neutral arbitrators under Section 
Co. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 85; Ceriali v. AMCO Ins. Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 500, 55 
Cal.Rptr.2d 685; Luster v. Collins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1338, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 215; Neaman v. Kaiser Foundation 
Hospital (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1170, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 879; Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 345, 
133 Cal.Rptr. 775.
34
   Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.85(a). 
35
   The new ethics standards are codified at Division VI of the Appendix to the California Rules of Court.
36
   Id.  
37
   As originally enacted, Section 1281.9(b) provided that a neutral arbitrator “shall be disqualified” if he or she 
failed to comply with the disclosure requirements set forth in Section 1281.9(a) and any party entitled to receive the 
disclosures served a notice of disqualification within 15 days of the arbitrator’s proposed appointment.  Section 
1281.9(c) provided that a neutral arbitrator “shall be disqualified” on the basis of his or her disclosures if any party 
entitled to receive the disclosure serves a notice of disqualification within 15 days after service of the disclosure 
statement.  Stats. 1994, c. 1202 (SB 1638), § 1.
91281.9(a)(1),38 thereby elevating arbitrator ethics to the level of judicial ethics with the stroke of 
the pen.
3. New Ethics Rules Cases
Since the effective date of the New Ethics Rules in July 2002, there has been a steady 
stream of cases – some reported and some not – involving the enforceability and application of 
the new legislation.  While California is no stranger to controversy in the arbitration arena,39 the 
litigation fanfare which has accompanied the New Ethics Rules legislation is unprecedented.  As 
discussed below, the cases fall into four general categories and demonstrate through their 
conflicting holdings the clouds of controversy and uncertainty that presently hang over private 
arbitration in California.  The four categories are:  preemption challenges under federal securities 
law; preemption challenges under the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”); contract defense 
challenges under California law; and cases applying the New Ethics Rules by seeking vacatur for 
failure to comply with the disclosure and disqualification requirements.
A. Federal Securities Law Preemption Challenges
(1) Backdrop
The SEC encourages the use of arbitration in resolving disputes arising out of the 
securities industry.40  In 1987, the Supreme Court held in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
38
   Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.91(d).
39
   In 1984, the United States Supreme Court was asked to determine whether franchisees’ agreement to arbitrate all 
disputes with the franchisor was enforceable in the face of the California Franchise Investment Law which provided 
that franchise disputes were excepted from coverage under the California Arbitration Act and could not be forced to 
arbitration over the franchisee’s objection.  Southland v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1, 79 L.Ed.2d 1, 104 S.Ct. 852.  
The Supreme Court invalidated the California Franchise Investment Law provision in question (§ 1512) because it 
selected out arbitration agreements for invalidation on grounds not related to the enforceability of contracts in 
general.
40
   Jamie Kent, The Debate in California Over and Implications of New Ethical Standards for Arbitrator 
Disclosure:  Are the Changes Valid or Appropriate?, 17 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 903, 906 (Summer 2004) (the “Kent 
Article”), citing, Michael A. Pierno, Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding Arbitrator 
Conflict Disclosure Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities Arbitrations (Nov. 4, 2002).
10
McMahon,41 that “claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 … could be 
submitted to arbitration.”42  Pursuant to this support, self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) 
regulated by the SEC43 have integrated arbitration into their operations.
Almost immediately after the New Ethics Rules became effective in July 2002, litigation 
was filed challenging the enforceability of the new disclosure and vacatur requirements as 
applied to arbitrations conducted by the NYSE, the second oldest national securities exchange in 
the United States,44 and the NASD.  As SROs, the NYSE and NASD are part of the 
comprehensive system of federal regulation of the securities industry.  While SROs are subject to 
oversight by the SEC,45 they are nevertheless private organizations.  Under the Supremacy 
Clause, federal law preempts conflicting state law.46  Federal regulations issued by an agency 
within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority are included among the “Laws of the 
United States” which can preempt state law.47  The unique circumstance presented by the cases 
discussed below is that the arbitration rules at issue were adopted by the SROs – which are 
private entities – as distinguished from the SEC or some other federal agency.
41
   (1987) 482 U.S. 220, 96 L.Ed.2d 185, 107 S.Ct. 2332 
42
   Kent Article, supra, citing, Carbonneau Article, supra, 40 Me. L. Rev. at 268.
43 The National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (“NYSE”) are 
SROs registered with the SEC pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq. (the “Exchange Act”).  The NASD is registered 
under 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3.  The NYSE is registered under 15 U.S.C. § 78f.
44
   15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, et seq.; see Mayo, 258 F.Supp.2d at 1101.
45
   15 U.S.C. § 78s; Austin Mun. Securities, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc. (5th Cir. 1985) 757 F.2d 
676, 680.
46
   U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.
47 City of New York v. FCC (1988) 486 U.S. 57, 63-64, 100 L.Ed.2d 48, 108 S.Ct. 1637.
11
Prior to the adoption of the New Ethics Rules, the NYSE and NASD lobbied the 
California Legislature and Judicial Council for an exemption from the New Ethics Rules.48
Those lobbying efforts failed.  In response, the NYSE and NASD ceased appointing arbitrators 
to arbitrations in California as of the July 1, 2002 effective date of the New Ethics Rules because 
they believed those rules were inconsistent with their respective arbitrator disclosure rules and in 
conflict with the SRO arbitration programs which are part of a federal regulatory system 
overseen on a uniform, national basis by the SEC.49  Both organizations likewise adopted interim 
rules, approved by the SEC, which gave customers and associated persons the option to waive 
application of the New Ethics Rules and proceed with arbitrator appointment under the NASD or 
NYSE rules or to proceed with arbitration out-of-state.50
(2) NASD Case
In addition to the above-described actions, the NASD and NYSE also filed a declaratory 
relief action in July 2002 seeking a judicial determination that the New Ethics Rules were 
inapplicable to SRO arbitrations.51  The NASD case was dismissed on November 12, 2002 
without reaching the merits based on the court’s conclusion that the Judicial Council and its 
individual members (sued in their official capacities) were immune from suit in federal court 
48 Mayo, 258 F.Supp.2d at 1102.
49
   NASD “Notice to Parties in California Arbitration Matters”; NYSE “Notice to California Investors in Arbitration 
under NYSE Rules.”  Professor Menkel-Meadow has written that “perhaps the most important source of ‘law’ in 
ethics and standards in the conduct of arbitration is the contract or agreement that establishes the arbitration in the 
first place.”  Menkel-Meadow Article, supra, 56 U. Miami L. Rev. at 972.  This is because contracts containing pre-
dispute arbitration clauses frequently specify which SROs or provider organizations may conduct the arbitration and 
provides that the proceeding will be governed by the standards of the presiding organization.  See, Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co. (1974) 417 U.S. 506, 519, 41 L.Ed.2d 270, 94 S.Ct. 2449 (“An agreement to arbitrate before a specified 
tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits … the procedure to be used in the 
dispute.”
50
   NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 10100(f); NYSE Arbitration Rules, Rule 600(g).
51 NASD Dispute Resolution v. Judicial Council of CA (N.D.Cal. 2002) 232 F.Supp.2d 1055. 
12
under the Eleventh Amendment.52  That determination thus left the issue to private-party 
litigation, of which there has been plenty.
(3) Mayo Case
In April 2003, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
decided Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,53 which addressed the issue of whether the New 
Ethics Rules apply to SRO arbitrators in California.  In Mayo, an account holder filed a state 
court action in March 2001 against an investment company alleging that company’s failure to 
reimburse him for unauthorized ATM withdrawals in violation of the Electronic Funds Transfer 
Act and state law.  The investment company removed the action to federal court and filed a 
motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act,54 which was granted.  In 
February 2002, the account holder commenced arbitration proceedings before the NYSE55 by 
filing a statement of claim and executing a Uniform Submission Agreement.56  The arbitration 
was never convened because, in July 2002, the NYSE informed the plaintiff that it would not 
appoint an arbitrator in his case because it was temporarily suspending the assignment of all 
arbitrators in California in response to the New Ethics Rules.  Plaintiff then filed a motion 
seeking to be relieved entirely from his obligation to arbitrate the dispute, which the court 
construed as a motion for reconsideration on the basis of an intervening change in 
52
   Id. at 1063-1066.
53
   (N.D.Cal. 2003) 258 F.Supp.2d 1097.
54
   9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. (the “FAA”).
55
   The Client Account Agreement signed by the plaintiff provided for arbitration “only before the New York Stock 
Exchange, Inc.; the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; or the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, 
as [plaintiff] may elect.”  Mayo, 258 F.Supp.2d at 1099.
56
   The Uniform Submission Agreement provides that the arbitration “will be conducted in accordance with the 
Constitution, By-Laws, Rules, Regulations and/or Code of Arbitration Procedure of the sponsoring organization.”  
Mayo, 258 F.Supp.2d at 1100.
13
circumstance:57 namely, did the NYSE’s refusal to appoint an arbitration panel that was 
compliant with the New Ethics Rules constitute a change in circumstances warranting the 
requested relief?58
The court in Mayo found that the Exchange Act and its subsequent amendments created 
“’a detailed, comprehensive system of federal regulation of the securities industry,’” in which 
SROs played an important and necessary role.59  The court noted that while the SRO arbitration 
rules and California standards shared “similar goals with respect to disclosure and 
disqualification,”60 the fact of common end did not mean that their means were not conflicting.61
The court found that the means were conflicting in several regards:  that the New Ethics Rules 
would require arbitrators to disclose information that need not be disclosed under the NYSE or 
NASD rules;62 that application of the New Ethics Rules would require disqualification of 
arbitrators and vacatur of awards in circumstances where the SRO rules do not;63 and that under 
the New Ethics Rules, the role of the Director of Arbitration for the NASD and NYSE would be 
greatly reduced if not totally eliminated.64  The court concluded that the “disclosure and 
disqualification requirements of the SRO arbitration rules are tailored specifically to the 
57 Mayo, 258 F.Supp.2d at 1104.
58
   Id.
59
   258 F.Supp.2d at 1108, citing Swirsky v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers (1st Cir. 1997), 124 F.3d 59, 61.
60
   258 F.Supp.2d at 1109.
61
   Id., citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council (2000) 530 U.S. 363, 380, 147 L.Ed.2d 352, 120 S.Ct. 2288.
62
   Compare Standard 7(d) with NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 10312 and NYSE Arbitration Rules, 
Rule 610.
63
   Compare California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2(a)(6) with NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, 
Rules 10309-10313 and NYSE Arbitration Rules, Rules 608-611.
64
   258 F.Supp.2d at 1110.
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specialized nature of securities arbitration and that application of the New Ethics Rules to SROs 
would exert an “extraneous pull” on the regulatory scheme established by Congress.65  The 
plaintiff thus had no right to require that NYSE or its arbitrators comply with the New Ethics 
Rules and was not relieved of his contractual obligation to arbitrate the dispute in accordance 
with its arbitration rules.
(4) Jevne Case
Following close on the heels of the Mayo decision, in November 2003 a California court 
of appeal addressed the issue of whether the New Ethics Rules were preempted by the Exchange 
Act in Jevne v. Superior Court.66  In Jevne, investors filed an action in state court in the summer 
of 2000 against a brokerage firm alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duties and conversion.  
Defendants responded with a motion to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in 
an agreement relating to one of the investment accounts in issue.  The provision required all 
disputes arising out of the relationship between the parties to be settled through binding 
arbitration in accordance with the rules and procedures of the NASD.  Plaintiffs did not oppose 
the motion to compel and, in February 2001, the court granted the motion.  Thereafter, in May 
2001, the parties signed a Uniform Submission Agreement memorializing their agreement to 
have the arbitration conducted in accordance with NASD rules and overseen by NASD’s 
Director of Arbitration.  During the summer of 2001, the parties selected a three-arbitrator panel 
and arbitration was commenced in early 2002.  In October 2002, one of the arbitrators 
voluntarily recused himself.  By that time, the NASD had stopped appointing arbitrators in 
NASD arbitrations in California and, accordingly, informed plaintiffs that it would not appoint a 
65
   258 F.Supp.2d at 1111-1112.
66
   (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 486, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 542, review granted.
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replacement arbitrator unless they agreed to waive the New Ethics Rules or agreed to have the 
arbitration conducted in another state.  Plaintiffs would not agree to the waiver and instead filed 
a motion in the state court for an order setting aside the court’s prior order compelling binding 
arbitration and restoring the matter to the civil trial calendar.  Plaintiffs argued that the New 
Ethics Rules governed the NASD arbitration and that the agreement to arbitrate was no longer 
enforceable because the NASD refused to proceed with the arbitration without a waiver of the 
New Ethics Rules.  The state trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion concluding, in essence, that 
federal law preempted the New Ethics Rules.  Plaintiffs then filed a petition for writ of mandate 
with the court of appeal which, in turn, issued an order to show cause.
On review by the state court of appeal, one of the issues raised was whether the New 
Ethics Rules were preempted by the Exchange Act.67  Because no California state court had yet 
addressed this issue68 and because of its “far reaching implications for the general public,” the 
court of appeal invited amici curiae briefing from the NASD and NYSE, the SEC, the California 
Attorney General and the Judicial Council of California on the issue of federal conflict 
preemption.69  In this regard, the court of appeal noted that because Congress has provided for 
concurrent state regulation of securities,70 there was no express or field preemption under the 
federal securities laws of the New Ethics Rules,71 and only conflict preemption was implicated in 
67
   6 Cal.Rptr.3d 542, 547-548.
68
   Id., fn. 2, citing Alan v. Superior Court (UBS Painewebber, Inc.) (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 217, 231, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 
344, where federal preemption was raised but, because the NASD was not a party in the case and had not filed an 
amicus curiae brief, the court deferred decision on that issue to other civil actions in which the NASD was an active 
participant.
69
   6 Cal.Rptr.3d 542, 554.  
70
   15 U.S.C. § 77r.
71
   6 Cal.Rptr.3d 542, 554, citing, Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 345, 352, 
95 Cal.Rptr. 258 (state law remedies and regulations available under California Business and Professions Code 
Section 17200 supplement federal securities law).
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the case.72  The court of appeal then found that there was an actual conflict between the New 
Ethics Rules73 and the NASD rules74 concerning arbitrator disqualification.  Under Standard 10, 
an arbitrator is disqualified when a party files a notice with the court, and assuming the arbitrator 
fails to disqualify himself or herself upon learning the challenge, the superior court will make the 
ultimate decision on disqualification.  In contrast, under the NASD rules, the Director of 
Arbitration has the final say on any challenge for cause or any determination that a conflict of 
interest warranting disqualification exists.  The court of appeal thus held that there was “no 
reconciling the conflict between the [New Ethics Rules] and the NASD Rules; it is simply 
impossible to comply with both of them.”75
The court of appeal in Jevne also addressed the conflicts between the disclosures required 
under Standard 7 of the New Ethics Rules76 and those required under the NASD rules.77  In the 
court’s view, the New Ethics Rules were “simply more detailed than the NASD disclosure rules, 
which in itself does not make it impossible for parties, and in particular arbitrators, to comply 
with both sets of rules;”78 that a “difference in drafting philosophy does not present a physical 
conflict requiring preemption.”79  However, the lack of an actual conflict did not end the court’s 
72
   Id.
73
   CRC, Appendix, Div. VI, Std. 10.
74
   NASD Code of Arbitration Rules 10308-10313.
75
   118 Cal.App.4th 486, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, 555.
76
   CRC, Appendix, Div. VI, Std. 7(d).
77
   NASD Code of Arbitration Rules 10312(a).
78
   113 Cal.App.4th 486, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 542, 558.
79
   Id.  On this point, the court of appeal noted that its conclusion differed from that of the Mayo court, but reasoned 
that the Mayo decision only had persuasive value and was not binding precedent for California state court.  Id., 
citing, Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 830, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal.Rptr. 604.
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inquiry and, ultimately, the court found that Standard 7 “stands as an obstacle to the Exchange 
Act,” and was thus preempted.80
(5) Grunwald Case
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit handed down an expedited decision in Credit Suisse 
First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald81 and held that while NASD arbitrators come within the 
definition of “neutral arbitrators” under the New Ethics Rules, the Exchange Act preempts 
application of those rules to NASD-appointed arbitrators.  Grunwald involved an employment 
dispute between Scott Grunwald and his former employer, Credit Suisse First Boston (“CSFB”).  
After CSFB terminated Grunwald, he exhausted CSFB’s internal grievance procedures and 
participated in a mediation through JAMS/Endispute, which were the initial steps required by 
CSFB’s dispute resolution program.  Grunwald then filed a demand for arbitration with AAA.  
CSFB successfully obtained a preliminary injunction in district court that enjoined Grunwald 
from arbitrating before AAA because CSFB’s dispute resolution program required employees 
registered with NASD – like Grunwald – to arbitrate before an arbitration panel appointed by 
NASD.  Grunwald then filed a demand for arbitration with NASD.  Before the NASD appointed 
Grunwald’s arbitration panel, the New Ethics Rules were adopted and, similar to the facts in 
Mayo involving arbitration before the NYSE, the NASD refused to appoint a panel of arbitrators 
in California unless Grunwald waived the application of the New Ethics Rules or agreed to an 
80
   Id., citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council supra, 530 U.S. 363, 372, the court of appeal noted that 
“[p]reemption may be found either where a state law conflicts with a federal law or where the state law stands as an 
obstacle to the federal law.”  (Emphasis in original.)  The court went on to note that the SEC had concluded that 
allowing California arbitrations to be administered under a different set of rules would introduce inconsistency into 
the process and would thus undermine the national system of SRO arbitrations.  In light of the SEC’s “intense 
oversight” in the area of SRO arbitrations, the court was reluctant to “second guess the SEC’s determination” and 
felt “compelled to defer to the agency’s judgment.”  Id., at 560, citing Greier v. American Honda Motor Co. Inc.
(2000) 529 U.S. 861, 883, 146 L.Ed.2d 914, 120 S.Ct. 1913; Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc. (9th Cir. 1988) 
841 F.2d 282, 286.
81
   2005 WL 466202 (March 1, 2005).
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out-of-state arbitration.  Grunwald refused to waive the New Ethics Rules and declined the 
NASD’s offer to proceed with arbitration outside California.  He then filed a motion with the 
district court seeking modification or dissolution of the injunction order so that he could re-file 
his claims in state court or proceed to arbitration before AAA.  That motion was denied based on 
the district court’s findings that the New Ethics Rules do not apply to NASD arbitrators and that 
he could obtain a speedy and expeditious arbitration by submitting to arbitration outside 
California or by waiving application of the New Ethics Rules.  Grunwald took the matter up on 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit viewed the issue presented as whether SRO rules can 
preempt conflicting state laws even though they are rules adopted and enforced by private 
organizations.  On that issue, this was a case of first impression.82  The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that in light of the Ware decision and the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, which removed 
the original statute’s requirement that all SRO rules be consistent with “the applicable laws of 
the State in which [the exchange] is located,” the SRO rules approved by the Exchange 
Commission83 had preemptive force and would preempt the New Ethics Rules if they were found 
to be in conflict with the NASD arbitration disclosure rules.84
82
   In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 38 L.Ed.2d 348, 94 S.Ct. 383, the 
Supreme Court had only suggested by implication that SRO rules can in certain circumstances have preemptive 
force (conflicting state law “should be preempted by exchange self-regulation ‘only to the extent necessary to 
protect the achievement of the aims of the Securities Exchange Act.’”  Id. at 127, quoting Silver v. New York Stock 
Exchange (1963) 373 U.S. 341, 361, 10 L.Ed.2d 389, 83 S.Ct. 1246.
83
   The ultimate approval of a proposed SRO rule reflects the determination by the Exchange Commission that a 
rule is consistent with the purposes of the Exchange Act.  15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, supra, 482 US.. 220, 223 (“No proposed rule change may take effect unless the SEC finds that the 
proposed rule is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act.”  Additionally, the 1975 amendments to the 
Exchange Act gave the Exchange Commission the power to abrogate, add to and delete from the rules of any SRO 
“as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administration” of the SRO.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 78s(c).
84 Grunwald, 2005 WL 477202, p. 7.
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The Ninth Circuit found that the New Ethics Rules did conflict with the NASD 
arbitration disclosure rules and, as such were preempted.  First, the court found that the NASD 
could not simultaneously comply with the disqualification rules of both the NASD and the New 
Ethics Rules.  Under the New Ethics Rules, if an arbitrator fails to make a required disclosure or 
makes a disclosure which a party finds objectionable, that arbitrator is subject to mandatory and 
automatic disqualification once a party serves a timely notice of disqualification.85  If the 
arbitrator fails to remove himself or herself from the panel, the arbitration award is then subject 
to mandatory vacatur.86  In contrast, the NASD rules provide that the Director of Arbitration 
“may” remove an arbitrator if he or she fails to make a required disclosure.87  Thus, the New 
Ethics Rules require disqualification once a party serves a notice of disqualification, while the 
NASD rules grant discretion to the NASD Director of Arbitration to decide whether an arbitrator 
should be disqualified.88  Application of the New Ethics Rules “would strip the Director of 
Arbitration of his federally-recognized obligation to make a determination whether an arbitrator 
should in fact be disqualified.”89
Next, the court found that in contrast to the disqualification rules, it was not physically 
impossible for an arbitrator to simultaneously comply with the New Ethics Rules and the rules 
governing NASD arbitrations.  “Nothing in the NASD Code prevents an arbitrator from 
85
   CRC, Appendix, Div. VI, Std. 10(a)(1).
86
   Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1286.2(a)(6).
87
   NASD Code of Arbitration Rule 10308(d)(2).
88
   2005 WL 477202, p. 11.
89
   Id.
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disclosing more information than is required by the NASD Code’s disclosure rule.”90  The court 
concluded, however, that the second type of conflict preemption – frustration of purpose –
applied and accepted the position of the Commission that the application of the New Ethics 
Rules to NASD arbitrations “would frustrate the objectives of the Exchange Act.”91
(6) Conclusion
Disputes arising under customer and employment contracts in the securities industry 
seem to be directly analogous to disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements because 
(a) both are governed by federal law representing national policy for important aspects of 
interstate commerce which should be consistently applied on a nationwide basis, and (b) both 
have their own government-sanctioned dispute resolution tribunals and rules.  Based on the fact 
that both the state and federal courts which have addressed the issue of federal securities law 
preemption have concluded that the New Ethics Rules do indeed conflict with NYSE and NASD 
regulatory scheme established by Congress, it is probably only a matter of time before there is a 
definitive decision on this issue by the United States Supreme Court and possibly even the 
California Supreme Court if the California Legislature does not take action to amend the New 
Ethics Rules to except NASD and NYSE arbitrators from compliance with the new ethics 
standards.  Given the depth of reasoning in the Mayo, Jevne and Grunwald cases discussed 
above and the “failure of forum” problem discussed in Section 3(C) below, it is surprising that 
the California Legislature has persisted in this standoff and, to date, has refused to amend the 
90
   Id., citing NASD Code of Arbitration Rule 10312(a) and North Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n (9th Cir. 1983) 
720 F.2d 578, 583 (“While the state standards are more stringent than the federal standards, it is possible to comply 
with both.”)
91
   2005 W. 477202, p. 12, citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470, 496, 135 L.Ed.2d 700, 116 S.Ct. 
2240 (“[b]ecause the [Commission] is the federal agency to which Congress has delegated its authority to implement 
the provisions of the [Exchange Act], the agency is uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of 
state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.’”).
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New Ethics Rules to grant an exception to neutral arbitrators hearing disputes under the 
Exchange Act who are appointed by the NYSE or NASD arbitration tribunals.
B. Federal Arbitration Act Preemption Challenges
(1) Backdrop
The FAA was enacted in 1925 and declares a national policy favoring arbitration of 
disputes.92  Its purpose was “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, 
and to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts.”93  In order for an 
agreement to arbitrate to be subject to the FAA, the agreement itself must involve a “maritime 
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.94  The FAA requires 
courts to enforce arbitration agreements and leaves no room for the exercise of discretion, unless 
there is a ground to revoke the agreement.95  In a series of decisions handed down since 1983, the 
Supreme Court has construed the FAA as a federal declaration of pro-arbitration public policy 
that preempts contrary state law.96
92 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 52, 56, 131 L.Ed.2d 76, 115 S.Ct. 1212.
93 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (1991) 500 U.S. 20, 24, 114 L.Ed.2d 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647; Volt, supra, 
489 U.S. 468, 474..
94
   9 U.S.C. § 2.  Section 2 of the FAA provides that a written agreement to arbitrate in any contract involving 
interstate commerce or a maritime transaction “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  Section 1 of the FAA then defines “commerce” as 
“commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the 
District of Columbia, or between any such Territory or another, or between any such Territory and any State or 
foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation,” and expressly 
excludes application to employment contracts of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of workers engaged 
in foreign or interstate commerce.  9 U.S.C. § 1.
95
   9 U.S.C. § 4; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 218, 84 L.Ed.2d 158, 105 S.Ct. 1238; see 
also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 432 U.S. 105, 112, 149 L.Ed.2d 234, 121 S.Ct. 1302.
96
   Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur:  The Bookend Issues Under the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act, 2001 J. Disp. Resol. 67, 68 (“Hayford Article”); see also, Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 
489, 96 L.Ed.2d 426, 107 S.Ct. 2520 (“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural rules to the contrary.”).
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FAA preemption has been defined by six recent Supreme Court opinions which spring 
from the Court’s earlier opinions in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp.,97 and 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.98  In those cases, the Supreme 
Court stated its belief that the FAA is an exercise of the Commerce Clause authority creating a 
body of federal substantive law governing arbitration, applicable in both the federal and state 
courts.99  There are two dimensions to the law of preemption:100  The first concerns state law 
which is found to conflict with the FAA and is represented by Southland Corp. v. Keating,101
Perry v. Thomas,102 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson103 and Doctor’s Associates v. 
Casarotto.104  The second concerns interpretation of the parties’ contractual agreements to 
arbitrate in the course of determining the effect of those agreements on the state law-FAA 
preemption interaction,105 and is embodied in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of 
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University106 and Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 
Inc.107
97
   (1967) 388 U.S. 395, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270, 87 S.Ct. 1801.
98
   (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24, 74 L.Ed.2d 765, 103 S.Ct. 927.
99
   Hayford Article, supra, p. 69.
100
   Id. at p. 69.
101
   465 U.S. 1.
102
   482 U.S. 483.
103
   (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753.
104
   (1996) 517 U.S. 681, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902.
105
   Hayford Article, supra, p. 69.
106
   (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 103 L.Ed.2d 488, 109 S.Ct. 1248.
107
   (1995) 514 U.S. 52, 131 L.Ed.2d 76, 115 S.Ct. 121.
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The FAA itself contains no express preemptive provisions, nor does it reflect a 
congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.108  Likewise, the FAA does not 
represent a federal policy of favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules.109  States 
are free to establish their own arbitration rules and procedures even where the controversy is 
governed by federal substantive law.110  State laws concerning arbitration are only preempted to 
the extent that they conflict with congressional intent to favor the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.111  In this regard, state laws may be preempted to the extent that they actually 
conflict with federal law or stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”112
As a general rule, state laws that single out arbitration agreements for special scrutiny in 
terms of enforceability or suspect status have been viewed as inhospitable to arbitration and 
routinely have been found to be preempted under the FAA.113  State laws that are not anti-
arbitration are not automatically preempted under the FAA.  In this regard, the Supreme Court 
has specifically recognized California’s procedures and rules governing arbitration as being 
108 Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at 477.
109
   Id. at 467-477.
110 Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131, 138, 101 L.Ed.2d 123, 108 S.Ct. 2302.
111 Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at 477.
112
   Id., quoting Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67, 85 L.Ed. 581, 61 S.Ct. 399; see also Southland, supra, 
465 U.S. 1, 16; Perry v. Thomas, supra, 482 U.S. at 489-490.
113
   See, e.g., Doctor’s Associates, supra, 517 U.S. 681 (preempting Montana law which invalidated arbitration 
agreements unless they contained special notice placed on first page of the agreement); Allied-Bruce, supra, 513 
U.S. 265, 270 (preempting Alabama law which invalidated predispute arbitration agreements); Southland, supra, 
465 U.S. 1 (preempting California law which invalidated arbitration agreements between franchisors and 
franchisees).
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“designed to encourage resort to the arbitration process” and not to conflict with “any policy 
embodied in the FAA.”114
Prior to the enactment of the New Ethics Rules, the law was clear that there was no 
federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; that federal policy was 
directed at simply ensuring “the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to 
arbitrate.”115  In the cases discussed below, the courts were asked to determine whether the FAA 
preempted the New Ethics Rules and thus made them legally ineffective in arbitrations subject to 
the FAA, potentially reaching far beyond the securities arbitrations discussed in Section A, 
above.
(2) Mayo Case
As discussed in Section A, above, in April 2003, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California was asked to decide whether the New Ethics Rules apply to SRO 
arbitrators in California.116  In addition to the preemption challenge under the Exchange Act, the 
court was also ask to determine whether the New Ethics Rules were preempted under the 
FAA.117  In ruling on this issue, the court adopted the contract analysis seen in Volt and held that 
under the FAA, the defendant (Morgan Stanley) had a right to enforce the arbitration agreement 
according to its terms, which terms provided for arbitration before the NYSE in accordance with 
114 Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at 476.
115 Mastrubuono, supra, 514 U.S. 52, 66, quoting Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at 476.  “Indeed, short of authorizing trial 
by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a panel of three monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedures 
they want to govern the arbitration of their disputes.”  Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc. (7th Cir. 1994) 28 
F.3d 704, 709.
116 Mayo, supra, 258 F.Supp.2d 1097.
117
   Id. at 1112-1116.
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NYSE arbitration rules.118  The court thus determined that application of the New Ethics Rules 
“would impose inconsistent and conflicting procedural rules upon those specifically agreed upon 
by the parties.”119  Because such a result is impermissible under the FAA, the court held that the 
New Ethics Rules “at least as applied here, conflict with the FAA and the federal policy 
embedded therein.”120  On this point, the court rejected the California Attorney General’s 
argument that the New Ethics Rules do not offend any principle of the FAA because the 
Supreme Court had previously stated in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty 
Co.121 that it could “perceive no way in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process [would] 
be hampered by the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that 
might create an impression of possible bias.”122  The court found that the New Ethics Rules “do a 
great deal more than require additional disclosure” and that preemption is not precluded just 
because the New Ethics Rules and the FAA may share similar goals.123  The turning point in the 
court’s analysis was the specific agreement of the parties to submit to arbitration before the 
NYSE in accordance with its rules.  Significantly, the court did not determine that the New 
Ethics Rules conflicted directly with the FAA.  The court was careful to limit its ruling to the 
circumstances and issues presented by plaintiff’s dispute with Morgan Stanley:  namely, the 
terms of those parties’ pre-dispute arbitration agreement.124
118
   Id. at 1114.
119
   Id.
120
   Id.  
121
   (1968) 393 U.S. 145, 21 L.Ed.2d 301, 89 S.Ct. 337.
122
   Id. at 149.
123
   258 F.Supp.2d at 1114.
124
   Id. at 1115-1116.
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(2) Jevne Case
As discussed in Section A, above, in November 2003 the California court of appeal was 
asked to decide whether the New Ethics Rules apply to SRO arbitrators in California.125  Unlike 
Mayo, the court in Jevne first addressed whether the New Ethics Rules were preempted under the 
FAA before addressing preemption under the Exchange Act.126  In Jevne, it was argued that the 
FAA preempted the New Ethics Rules because they applied only to arbitration contracts and 
imposed terms which differed from those in the parties’ arbitration agreement.  The Court noted 
that state laws concerning arbitration are only preempted to the extent that they conflict with 
congressional intent to favor the enforcement of arbitration agreements; that state laws that are 
not anti-arbitration or antagonistic to the process are not automatically preempted by the FAA 
even though the state law relates only to arbitration agreements; and that the Supreme Court has 
previously recognized that California’s procedures and rules governing arbitration “are 
manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral process,” do not conflict with “any policy 
emobodied in the FAA” and “generally foster the federal policy favoring arbitration.”127  The 
court found that the New Ethics Rules were “consistent with the other California arbitration 
procedures the Volt court endorsed” and rejected the general preemption argument.128
It was also argued in Jevne that the New Ethics Rules were preempted by the FAA as 
applied to the facts of that particular case because the New Ethics Rules differ from the NASD 
arbitration procedures specifically agreed to by the parties in their arbitration agreement.  The 
real parties in interest argued that under the FAA they are entitled to have the arbitration 
125 Mayo, supra, 258 F.Supp.2d 1097.
126
   6 Cal.Rptr. 542, 551.
127
   Id. at 552, citing Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at 476.
128
   Id. at 552, citing Commonwealth, supra, 393 U.S. at 149.
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agreement enforced according to its terms.  The real parties in interest argued that Jevne’s efforts 
to avoid arbitration altogether based on the New Ethics Rules must fail because an arbitration 
agreement subject to the FAA may be invalidated only on legal or equitable grounds applying to 
the revocation of any contract.129  While the court agreed that some question remained as to 
whether the New Ethics Rules were preempted as a matter of fact, it declined to reach that issue 
in view of its conclusion that the New Ethics Rules were preempted by the Exchange Act.130
4. Conclusion
Jevne and Mayo represent two different approaches to the FAA preemption issue and two 
different outcomes.  The Mayo decision found preemption under the FAA as a matter of fact, 
based upon the court’s interpretation of and reference to the parties’ contract which provided for 
arbitration before the NYSE in accordance with its rules.  In order to enforce the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate before their selected tribunal, the court had to respect the rules of that 
tribunal which the court had already found were preempted by the Exchange Act, and in this 
context found preemption under the FAA.  Significantly, the Mayo court did not determine that 
the New Ethics Rules conflicted directly with the FAA.  The Jevne decision is thus important 
because it did address the issue of whether the New Ethics Rules conflict directly with the FAA 
and concluded that they do not, at least with respect to the disclosure requirements.
C. Impossibility and Other Contract Defense Challenges
Under Section 2 of the FAA, an agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable and 
enforceable, as a matter of federal law, except upon such grounds as exist as defenses to the 
validity or enforceability of contracts generally.  A state law principle that takes it meaning 
129
   Id. at 552, fn. 8, citing 9 U.S.C. § 2; Southland, supra, 465 U.S. 1, 10.
130
   Id. at 552, fn. 8 
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precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with Section 2 of 
the FAA.131  In assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, the court may 
not construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes 
nonarbitration agreements under state law, nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an 
agreement to arbitrate as a basis for holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.132
The first reported decision to address challenges to the New Ethics Rules in the context 
of contract defense challenges was Alan v. Superior Court (USB Painewebber, Inc.)133 decided in 
August 2003 by Division 1 of the California Court of Appeal, Second District.  In Alan, the court 
was asked to interpret the arbitration provisions contained in the parties’ customer agreement and 
decide whether the agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable in view of the NASD’s refusal to 
provide an arbitral forum in California:  i.e., could plaintiff be excused from his obligation to 
arbitrate based on NASD’s refusal to perform?134  The Alan case started with plaintiff bringing a 
civil action in state court even though the customer agreement required him to arbitrate before 
NASD, NYSE or another national securities exchange.  The customer agreement provided that if 
the investor failed to select the arbitral forum, the brokerage firm could select the arbitral 
forum.135  In response to the lawsuit, the defendants filed a motion seeking an order compelling 
the plaintiff to arbitrate the dispute and staying the state court action.  Because the plaintiff had 
131 Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 492-493, fn. 9, 96 L.Ed.2d 426, 107 S.Ct. 2520.
132
   Id.; see also Thomas v. Perry (1988) 200 Cal.App.3 510, 514-515, 246 Cal.Rptr. 156 (argument that the NYSE 
rules for selection of an arbitrator are unfair is clearly the type addressed to the uniqueness of an agreement to 
arbitrate).
133
   (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 217, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 377.
134 Alan, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 217.  The court was also asked to determine that the New Ethics Rules were 
preempted by federal law.  Because the NASD was not a party to the writ proceedings, the court refused to address 
this argument as raised by defendants.  Id. at 231.
135
   Id. at 220-221.
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not selected an arbitral forum, the defendants designated the NASD as the arbitral forum.136  The 
trial court granted defendant’s motion and ordered the plaintiff to proceed to arbitration before 
the NASD, disregarding plaintiff’s claim that the NASD was no longer appointing arbitrators in 
California as a result of the dispute concerning the application of the New Ethics Rules to SROs, 
as discussed in Section 3(A), above.137
Without submitting the matter to the NASD, the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of 
mandate to the California Court of Appeal.  Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate was granted 
based on the court’s finding that (a) because the customer agreement required all arbitrations to 
be conducted in a forum convened by, and subject to the rules of, the chosen SRO, and (b) 
because the NASD and NYSE were no longer convening arbitrations in California, it was 
impossible to enforce the agreement to arbitrate because there was a failure of forum.138  The 
court rejected defendants’ argument that the trial court could appoint an arbitrator under 
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.6139 in the absence of the NASD doing so, 
finding that because the parties agreement to arbitrate designated the NASD as the arbitral 
forum, only its arbitrators – not an arbitrator outside the NASD – could be appointed to hear the 
136
   Id. at 223.
137
   Id.
138
   Id.
139
   Section 1281.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure states:  “If the arbitration agreement provides a 
method of appointing an arbitrator, that method shall be followed.  If the arbitration agreement does not provide a 
method for appointing an arbitrator, the parties to the agreement who seek arbitration and against whom arbitration 
is sought may agree on a method of appointing an arbitrator and that method shall be followed. In the absence of an 
agreed method, or if the agreed method fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an arbitrator appointed 
fails to act and his or her successor has not been appointed, the court on petition of a party to the arbitration 
agreement, shall appoint the arbitrator.”  (Italics added.)
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matter in accordance with NASD rules.140  While acknowledging that it was consistent under 
both the California Arbitration Act and the FAA for the court to appoint an arbitrator if that was 
the obstacle to convening an arbitration,141 the court found that its appointment of an arbitrator 
was “not an adequate alternative to an NASD forum.”142
The case was remanded to the trial court to decide whether any out-of-state location 
selected by NASD was a reasonable and proper forum to hear the dispute.  In this regard, the 
defendants argued that plaintiff had no legitimate grounds to complain about being forced to 
attend an arbitration in another state because the forum selection clause in the NASD rules allow 
the NASD to conduct the hearing in any location it chooses.143  The court held that defendants’ 
interpretation of the NASD Code of Arbitration was “open to challenge” because the case law is 
clear that a court may set aside a forum-selection clause if enforcement would be unreasonable 
or unjust or if proceedings in the contractual forum would be so gravely difficult and 
inconvenient that the resisting party would for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in 
court.144  The court concluded by remanding the case back to the trial court to decide whether the 
out-of-state location selected by NASD was proper, stating that “[i]f the out-of-state location is 
140
   111 Cal.App.4th at 224-227, citing, In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative Lit. (2d Cir. 1995) 68 F.3d 554 
(failure of NYSE forum due to the NYSE’s decision that the disputed should not be arbitrated, which was within its 
discretion to do).
141
   Id. at 228-229, citing, Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp. (11th Cir. 2000) 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (arbitration 
may proceed in forum not mentioned in arbitration clause where choice of arbitral forum was not an integral part of 
the agreement); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1097, 1107, 228 
Cal.Rptr. 345 (dictum stating that arbitral for a contained in arbitration provision were not exclusive arbitral for a; 
no analysis of whether choice of for a was an integral term of the agreement); McManus v. CIBC World Markets 
Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 76, 102, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 (same). 
142
   Id. at 229.
143
   Id. at 230.  
144 Id., citing, Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth (1985) 473 U.S. 614, 632-633, 87 L.Ed.2d 444, 105 
S.Ct. 3346; Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson (8th Cir. 2001) 248 F.3d 720, 726; Hayes Children 
Leasing Co. v. NCR Corp. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 755, 787, fn. 5, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 650; Bolter v. Superior Court
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 900, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 888; Wilmot v. McNabb (N.D.Cal. 2003) 269 F.Supp.2d 1203. 
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proper, the dispute should be resolved through arbitration there.  If the out-of-state location is not 
proper, the dispute should be resolved here and … should be adjudicated in court.”145
On remand, the trial court concluded: (1) the New Ethics Rules were preempted by 
federal law; (2) the New Ethics Rules could not be applied retroactively to modify or amend any 
provision of the client agreements; and (3) by agreeing to arbitrate future disputes before the 
NASD according to the rules of the NASD, plaintiff prospectively waived the applicability of the 
New Ethics Rules.146  The trial court thus renewed its order directing the matter back to 
arbitration.147  Plaintiff filed a “Statement of Claim” with the NASD and paid the required filing 
fee, but the NASD would not assign a location for the hearing unless plaintiff first waived any 
objection to the location.  Plaintiff refused to give such a waiver in order to preserve his right to 
return to the trial court.  Given this deadlock, the NASD closed the case without hearing and 
without prejudice.  Plaintiff then returned to the trial court and filed a motion for reconsideration 
of the order directing the matter to arbitration, arguing that because the NASD refused to 
adjudicate the matter absent a waiver, there was a failure of arbitral forum and the case should be 
tried in court.  The trial court granted the motion for reconsideration but, upon reconsideration, 
concluded that the matter should be arbitrated.  However, because the NASD refused to convene 
an arbitration without a waiver from plaintiff, which plaintiff would not give, the suit was in 
limbo.148  Plaintiff then filed a second petition with the California Court of Appeal for a 
peremptory writ of mandate.149
145
   Id.
146 Alan v. Superior Court (2005) 2004 WL 293286, page 4 (Not Officially Published).
147
   Id.
148
   Id.
149
   Id. at 5.
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In the second appeal, the court rejected defendants’ contention that arbitration was 
required because the trial court had resolved the preemption, retroactivity and prospective waiver 
issues in their favor because -- despite those rulings -- the NASD “was not influenced” and “still 
refused to arbitrate the dispute.”150  The appellate court determined that the dispute “is to be tried 
in court” because the NASD, the forum selected by the defendants, refused to hear the matter and 
was “not willing to conduct arbitrations in California, absent a signed waiver, until the pending 
litigation – in the California Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and possibly the United States 
Supreme Court – is final.”151  The appellate court concluded that there was thus not “a plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy at law.”  The trial court was instructed to vacate the orders 
compelling arbitration and to restore the case to the civil active list for trial.152
Since the Alan case was first reported in 2003, there have been a number of cases, mostly 
unreported, where plaintiffs sought to avoid their contractual obligations to arbitrate securities 
disputes through various contract defense attacks similar to that raised in Alan.153  The only case 
to follow Alan was a decision reported by Division 6 of the Second District of the California 
150
   Id.
151
   Id.
152
   Id.  In this regard, the court noted that plaintiff had filed his complaint in September 2002 and that the statistics 
provided by the Judicial Council showed that during the 2002-2003 fiscal year, 93 percent of all general unlimited 
civil cases filed in Los Angeles Superior Court reached disposition within two years, and that is was thus “time for 
this case to be heard.”  Id.  The court also noted that “California has a long established and well settled policy 
favoring arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive means of settling disputes.”  Id. at page 2, citing Hightower v. 
Superior Court  (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1431, 104 Cal.Rptr. 209.
153 Wilmot v. McNabb, supra 269 F.Supp.2d 1203; Belinsky v. BPM Goldman Financial Design, LLC (Cal.App.1 
Dist. 2004) 2004 WL 263250 (Not Officially Published); Chen v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. (Cal.App.2nd Dist. 2004) 
2004 WL 33433 (Not Officially Published); Davis v. Oppenheimer & Co. (Cal.App.1st Dist. 2004) 2004 WL 
1053191 (Not Officially Published); Linden v. American Express Financial, Inc. (Cal.App.2nd Dist. 2003) 2003 WL 
22430229 (Not Officially Published); Marcus v. Trautman Waserman & Company, Inc. (Cal.App. 1st Dist. 2004) 
2004 WL 2191332 (Not Officially Published); Rodriquez v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. (Cal.App.4th Dist. 2003) 2003 
WL 22089385 (Not Officially Reported); Winberg v. Salomon Smith Barney (Cal.App. 5th Dist. 2004) 2004 WL 
292217 (Not Officially Reported).
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Court of Appeal shortly after Alan was reported.154  The balance of the cases have rejected or 
distinguished Alan on federal law preemption grounds, relying on the decisions in Mayo and 
Jevne which were reported after the first Alan decision,155 have granted the brokerage firms’ 
motions to compel arbitration, and have found no problem with the NYSE and NASD rules 
excepting their arbitrators from compliance with the New Ethics Rules and requiring plaintiffs to 
waive the New Ethics Rules for an arbitration in California or consent to arbitration in an out-of-
state forum.
As applied to securities arbitrations, the “failure of forum” challenges discussed in this 
section are disconcerting because even though ordered to arbitration, the arbitrations have not 
been convened and the parties’ disputes have not been resolved due to the impasse between the 
California Legislature and the NASD / NYSE as to whether or not the NASD / NYSE arbitrators 
should be subject to the New Ethics Rules.  This situation is completely at odds with the concept 
that private arbitration provides the parties with quicker results than what is available in court 
and with shorter and less costly proceedings.  The cases discussed in this section illustrate that 
the stalemate concerning the application of the New Ethics Rules to securities arbitrations has 
154 Linden v. American Express Financial, supra, 2003 WL 22430229 (order compelling arbitration vacated due to 
impossibility and impracticability of performance because NASD will not appoint arbitrator without investor 
waiving compliance with New Ethics Rules; preemption issue not reached because not raised at the trial level).
155 Wilmot v. McNabb, supra (follows Mayo; no right to arbitrate in California before arbitration panel that is 
compliant with the New Ethics Rules); Belinsky v. BPM Goldman Financial Design, LLC, supra (no failure of 
forum; NASD justified in refusing to process plaintiff’s claim because plaintiff did not comply with NASD rules for 
commencing an arbitration); Chen v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., supra (followed Jevne and Mayo; expressly declined 
to follow Alan); Davis v. Oppenheimer & Co., supra (no problem with NYSE rules requiring waive of New Ethics 
Rules and consent to out-of-state forum; New Ethics Rules preempted by federal securities law); Marcus v. 
Trautman Waserman & Company, Inc., supra (validates NASD waiver requirements and finds New Ethics Rules 
preempted by federal securities law); Rodriquez v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., supra (rejected argument that NYSE 
and NASD rules that except their arbitrators from compliance with the New Ethics Rules make agreement to 
arbitrate illegal; motion to compel arbitration granted); Winberg v. Salomon Smith Barney, supra (follows Jevne and 
Mayo; declines to follow Alan).
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had the opposite result:  the parties have been involved in costly and protracted legal proceedings 
and been unable to convene – let alone conclude – their arbitrations.
D. Enforcement and Application 
Thus far, there has been only one reported decision in which the New Ethics Rules have 
been applied, rather than challenged.  That case is Azteca Construction, Inc. v. ADR Consulting, 
Inc.,156 and was decided by the Third District of the California Court of Appeal in September 
2004.  In Azteca, the parties’ agreement included a provision for private arbitration of any 
disputes in accordance with the AAA’s then entitled “Construction Industry Dispute Resolution 
Procedures” (the “AAA Rules”).  A dispute arose in October 2002 and ADR served a demand on 
Azteca Construction for arbitration in accordance with the AAA Rules.  Because the parties were 
unable to agree on a neutral arbitrator from the AAA list, the AAA proposed the arbitrator, an 
attorney names Paul Taylor.  Taylor timely made the disclosures required under the New Ethics 
Rules in November 2002.  In accordance with AAA Rules forbidding any type of direct contact 
between the arbitrator and the parties or counsel before the arbitration hearing, those disclosures 
were communicated through AAA.
Taylor’s disclosure statement revealed that he had, within the past five years, served as a 
neutral arbitrator on matters in which ADR Consulting’s attorney had represented one or more 
parties.  Taylor also disclosed that in 1985 he had had a prior relationship with ADR 
Consulting’s attorney.  Finally, Taylor disclosed that a conflicts check run by the law firm to 
which he was “of counsel” reported a case in which Azteca Construction was listed as a potential 
adverse party to one of the law firm’s clients on a matter not involving Taylor.  In response to 
Taylor’s disclosures, Azteca Construction timely objected to Taylor’s appointment via a letter 
156
   (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1156, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 142.
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sent to AAA.  Azteca Construction requested that Taylor be removed as arbitrator based on his 
disclosed relationship with ADR Consulting’s attorney.  AAA investigated the objection and 
determined that Taylor should not be disqualified.  It then notified the parties that Taylor’s 
appointment was being reaffirmed.
An arbitration hearing was conducted in March 2003.  At the conclusion of the 
arbitration, Taylor rendered an interim award in favor of ADR Consulting for $39,140 plus the 
costs of the arbitration.  Azteca Construction again objected to Taylor’s appointment as arbitrator 
and requested that Taylor disqualify himself.  AAA again responded to the objection and 
reasserted its authority under AAA Rule R-20(b) to adjudicate and determine any objection to 
Taylor’s continued service.  Taylor then issued a final award in April 2003.  Not surprisingly, 
Azteca Construction responded by filing a petition with the court seeking to vacate the final 
award, claiming that Taylor was required to disqualify himself upon timely receipt of Azteca 
Constructions’ objection based upon Section 1281.91 (b)(1) and (d) and the New Ethics Rules.  
The court denied the petition based upon its finding that by agreeing to arbitration in 
conformance with the AAA Rules, which granted AAA conclusive authority over challenges to 
arbitrators, Azteca Construction had waived the right to disqualify Taylor under the California 
Arbitration Act provisions.
Azteca Construction appealed and, in a very well reasoned opinion surveying California 
arbitration law, the trial court was reversed.  In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Court of 
Appeal found that the provisions of the California Arbitration Act relating to arbitrator 
disqualification could not be waived because those statutory provisions were “enacted primarily 
for a public purpose.”157  In this regard, the Court of Appeal found that AAA Rule R-20(b) “must 
157
   Id. at 1167.
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yield to the disqualification scheme set forth in sections 1281.9 and 1281.91, for a number of 
reasons.”158  Among those reasons was the finding that the neutrality of the arbitrator is of 
crucial importance to the private arbitration process and that the California Supreme Court has 
heretofore termed the requirement of a neutral arbitrator “essential to ensuring the integrity of the 
arbitration process.”159  The court’s reasoning was sound.  Participants who agree to binding
arbitration are giving up constitutional rights to a jury trial and appeal.  Duties of disclosure and 
disqualification are thus designed to ensure an arbitrator’s impartiality.160  As stated by the 
California Court of Appeal in Britz, Inc. v. Alfa-Laval Food & Dairy Co.,161 even though state 
and federal policy favors private arbitration and the AAA is a respected provider of arbitration 
services, “AAA nevertheless is a business enterprise ‘in competition not only with other private 
arbitration services but with the courts in providing” and selling dispute resolution services.162
As such, the court found that “[o]nly by adherence to the Act’s prophylactic remedies can the 
parties have confidence that neutrality has not taken a back seat to expediency.”163
Having determined that the New Ethics Rules and right to disqualification for violation of 
the New Ethics Rules could not be waived, the Court of Appeal was then required to apply the 
law to the facts presented in the Azteca case.  The appellate court very simply and succinctly 
158
   Id.
159
   Id. at 1168, citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (200) 24 Cal.4th 83, 103, 6 P.3d 
669, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 825, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal.Rptr. 
604.
160
   Id., citing Knight, Rutter Group on Arbitration, ¶ 7:13, p. 7-7.
161
   (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1085, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 700 (held that “a trial court considering a petition to confirm or 
vacate an arbitration award is required to determine, de novo, whether the circumstances disclose a reasonable 
impression of arbitrator bias, when that issue is properly raised by a party to the arbitration). 
162
   Id. at 1102. quoting Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co. (7th Cir. 1983) 714 F.2d 673, 681.
163
   121 Cal.App.4th at 1168.
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determined that Taylor should have been disqualified before the arbitration began since Azteca 
Construction had properly and timely exercised its right to remove him under Section 1281.91 of 
the California Code of Civil Procedure based on his disclosures concerning his prior relationship 
with ADR Consultants’ counsel.164  In this regard, the Court of Appeal concluded that Azteca 
Construction could not waive its statutory rights to disqualify an arbitrator by agreeing to submit 
to arbitration before the AAA.  It also found that in resolving Azteca Construction’s objection to 
Taylor, the AAA was required to follow Sections 2381.9 and 2381.91 of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeal in Azteca found that Azteca Construction, as the party challenging 
the arbitrator’s appointment, “had no independent burden to demonstrate that a reasonable 
person would doubt Taylor’s capacity to be impartial. … The Legislature has already determined 
that any of the matters required to be disclosed … necessarily satisfies that standard.”165  It thus 
concluded that Azteca Construction’s timely demand for disqualification of the proposed 
arbitrator “had the same practical effect as a timely peremptory challenge to a superior court 
judge” and is automatic.166  Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s order 
denying Azteca Construction’s petition to vacate the arbitration award with directions to enter a 
new order granting the petition to vacate the award.167
The discussion in the Azteca decision about arbitrator disclosures and disqualification is 
misleading because it starts with a summary of the revisions to “the disclosure requirements and 
164
   Id. at 1168.
165
   Id. at 1169.
166 Id. at 1169-1170
167
   Id. at 1170.
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procedures for disqualifying arbitrators” as amended by SB 475168 and suggests that the 
disclosure requirements and disqualification procedures at issue in the case were new.  They 
were not.  For example, under Section 1281.9(a)(4), Taylor was obligated to disclose the prior 
cases in which he had served as a neutral arbitrator and in which any of the current parties or 
their attorneys were involved.  Although it has been renumbered over the years, that disclosure 
requirement has been on the books since Section 1281.9 was originally enacted in 1994.  
Likewise, the right of a party to disqualify a proposed appointee by serving a notice of 
disqualification within 15 days after service of the disclosure statement has been on the books 
since Section 1281.9 was originally enacted, and the right to vacatur where the arbitrator making 
the award was subject to disqualification but failed, upon receipt of a timely demand, to 
disqualify himself or herself has been on the books since 1997.  What the Azteca decision 
illustrates is that the concerns which prompted the California Legislature to enact the New Ethics 
Rules legislation was justified:  that AAA, through its rules and its procedures, had supplanted 
the clear statutory right of the parties to disqualify an arbitrator based upon his or her disclosures.
4. Controversies Created By The New Ethics Rules Case
A. Should Private Arbitrators be Held to the Same Standards as 
Judges?
With the exception of the Azteca case, what is really interesting about the cases discussed 
above is that the arguments in those cases centered largely around the ethical standards adopted 
by the Judicial Council pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.85 and have 
not addressed the bigger issue of whether private arbitrators should be held to the same standards 
of disclosure and disqualification as state court judges, which is what is statutorily mandated
168
   Id. at 1162.
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under California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1281.9(a)(1) and 1281.91(d).  It is hard to 
argue against such disclosure and disqualification standards given the breadth of disputes 
resolved in arbitral fora which places arbitration on par with the courts in terms of the types of 
civil disputes heard and decided.
Both federal and state courts are authorized to enforce agreements to arbitrate, and there 
is a strong public policy in favor of doing so.169  Nevertheless, until recently, courts were 
reluctant to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements to compel arbitration of claims created by 
statute, rather than those created by virtue of the parties’ contract.  This reluctance was based on 
the courts’ view that the legislative intent in creating a statutory right would be frustrated if that 
right was not effectively enforced, and on the concurrent belief that effective enforcement could 
only be obtained through the courts.  For example, in Wilko v. Swan, 170 the Supreme Court 
expressed concern that arbitrators in statutorily based cases must make legal determinations 
“without judicial instruction on the law” and that an arbitration award “may be made without 
explanation of [the arbitrator’s] reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings.”171
The Supreme Court also noted that the “power to vacate an award is limited” and that 
“interpretations of the law by the arbitrators, in contrast to manifest disregard, are not subject, in 
the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”172  The Supreme Court 
169
   Both the FAA and the Uniform Arbitration Act make agreements to arbitrate specifically enforceable.  There is 
a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a means of relieving court congestion, and both federal and state 
courts will interpret agreements to arbitrate broadly and exceptions narrowly.  See, e.g., McMahon, supra, 482 U.S. 
220; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (1960) 363 U.S. 574, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, 80 
S.Ct.1347; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal.Rptr. 882.
170
   (1953) 346 U.S. 427, 98 L.Ed. 168, 74 S.Ct. 182.
171
   Id. at 436.
172
   Id.
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concluded that in view of these drawbacks to arbitration, the plaintiff’s claims under the 
Exchange Act should not be ordered to arbitration.173
In a series of cases beginning in 1985, the Supreme Court has moved away from the 
Wilko standard and adopted a strong pro-arbitration position allowing compelled arbitration of 
statutory claims.  This approach began with the Supreme Court’s decision in Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,174 where the Court held that a pre-dispute arbitration 
clause in a sales agreement would be enforceable for purposes of compelling arbitration of one 
party’s antitrust claims against the other.175  In 1987, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon,176 the Court held that a pre-dispute arbitration clause contained in an investor’s 
customer agreement with the brokerage firm would be enforceable for purposes of compelling 
arbitration of the investor’s claims against the brokerage firm that it had violated both the 
Exchange Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).  In 1989, in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,177 the Court held that a pre-dispute 
arbitration clause contained in investors’ customer agreements with the brokerage firm would be 
enforceable for purposes of compelling arbitration of the investor’s claims that the brokerage 
firm had violated the Exchange Act and expressly overruled Wilko.178  In each of these cases, the 
Supreme Court took the position that while Congress could prohibit the arbitration of statute-
based claims, in the absence of clear evidence of such a prohibition in the statute’s text or 
173
   Id. at 438.
174
   (1985) 473 U.S. 614, 87 L.Ed.2d 444, 105 S.Ct. 3346.
175
   Id. at 624.
176
   (1987) 482 U.S. 220, 96 L.Ed.2d 185, 107 S.Ct. 2332.
177
   (1989) 490 U.S. 477, 104 L.Ed.2d 526, 109 S.Ct. 1917.
178
   “… Wilko was incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of other federal 
statutes governing arbitration agreements in the setting of business transactions.”  Id. at 482.
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legislative history, arbitration would be barred only on a showing that there exists an inherent 
conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purpose; that arbitration will not be 
prohibited on the basis of a generalized suspicion of the capacity of arbitration to protect 
statutory rights.179
Despite the strong pro-arbitration bias announced in the aforementioned cases, doubts 
still remained as to whether the Supreme Court would compel arbitration of statutory claims 
falling outside the commercial context of those cases.  In 1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp.,180 the Supreme Court laid most of these doubts to rest.  The plaintiff in Gilmer had 
been required by his employer to register with the New York Stock Exchange and his 
registration application included an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising out of the 
termination of his employment.  When plaintiff was terminated at age 62, he brought suit in 
federal district court, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).  
The employer moved to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA and the Supreme Court 
held that arbitration should be compelled, concluding that there had been no showing that 
Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that Act.181
179
   “In Mitsubishi, … we recognized that arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and legal 
complications of antitrust claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and supervision.  Likewise, we 
have concluded that the streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction on 
substantive rights.  Finally, … there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law; 
although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that 
arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.”  McMahon, supra, 482 U.S. at 232.
180
   (1991) 500 U.S. 20, 114 L.Ed.2d 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647.
181
   “Initially, we note that in our recent arbitration cases we have already rejected most of [plaintiff’s] arguments as 
insufficient to preclude arbitration of statutory claims.  Such generalized attacks on arbitration ‘res[t] on suspicion of 
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,’ and 
as such, they are ‘far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of 
resolving disputes.’”  500 U.S. at 30.
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As a direct result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer, there has been an increased 
interest in the use of mandatory arbitration of many different types of statute-based disputes.182
This increased use of arbitration is itself quite controversial and focuses on the potential 
unfairness of imposing binding arbitration on unsuspecting consumers, employees, patients, etc. 
due to the lack of negotiation between the parties.  Given the rapidly expanding use of contract 
arbitration giving neutral arbitrators decision making authority in civil disputes that is almost 
equal to that of their judicial counterparts, coupled with the recognition that arbitrations are 
private proceedings in which there is limited access to judicial review of the proceedings or the 
arbitrator’s decision, the New Ethics Rules are both appropriate and necessary if arbitration is to 
be perceived as a process that is inherently fair and a reasonable alternative to litigation.  It has 
been held that a dispute resolution process is not an arbitration unless it includes a mechanism 
for ensuring neutrality in the rendering of the decision. 183  If arbitrator’s are going to have 
decision making power greater than that afforded judges, whose proceedings are open to the 
public and whose decisions are subject to several levels of judicial review, then it is submitted 
that it is reasonable to expect arbitrators to abide by ethics rules that are at least as strict as those 
followed by their judicial counterparts in order to ensure the neutrality of the decision maker.
182
   ADR Text, p. 242.
183 Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assocs. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 676, 684, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 867; Elliot & Ten 
Eyck Partnership v. City of Long Beach (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 495, 503, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 140; Saeta v. Superior 
Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 261, 268, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 610. 
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B. Should the New Ethics Rules be Invalidated under the Federal 
Securities Law?
This question calls into issue the friction between the national policy of consistent 
handling of securities disputes and uniform application of the NASD / NYSE arbitration rules, 
on the one hand, and the perceived need for greater procedural safeguards in private arbitration 
given the expanded scope of arbitrability to include statute-based claims and other matters 
arising outside the context of the parties’ commercial agreement, on the other.  Based on the 
discussion in Section 3(A), it would appear that this issue will be resolved in favor of exempting 
the NASD and NYSE from the New Ethics Rules because those rules, standards and procedures 
directly conflict with and exert an “extraneous pull” on the regulatory scheme established by 
Congress for resolving securities industry disputes.
C. Should the New Ethics Rules be Invalidated under the FAA?
As the discussion in Section 3 demonstrates, the case controversies which have arisen to 
date have focused on the expanded disclosure requirements contained in the New Ethics Rules.  
What the Azteca decision illustrates is that disqualification of an arbitrator is automatic once a 
timely demand is made based upon an arbitrator’s improper disclosures and that vacatur under 
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2(a)(6) is mandatory if the arbitrator making 
the award was subject to disqualification upon a grounds specified in California Code of Civil 
Procedure Section 1281.91 but failed upon receipt of a timely demand to disqualify himself or 
herself.  It is this aspect of the New Ethics Rules that is starkly at odds with the FAA.
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Under the FAA, an arbitrator’s mere failure to disclose a conflict is not a basis to vacate 
an award.  Proof of partiality is required.184  Since California courts have routinely treated the 
failure to make disclosures as arbitrator misconduct under California Code of Civil Procedure 
Section 1286.2(a)(3), Section 1286.2(a)(6) would appear to be superfluous and unnecessary to 
the protection of the integrity of the private arbitration process.185  Eliminating Section 
1286.2(a)(6) would bring California’s grounds for vacatur in line with Section 10 of the FAA 
and eliminate this controversial issue.
One authority has predicted that to the extent the California grounds for vacatur departs 
from the grounds provided under the FAA, “there is a significant potential that litigation will 
ensue over whether an award involves interstate commerce” and, if so, whether the California 
grounds for vacatur are preempted by the FAA.186  Another authority has described such 
anticipated challenges as the “second generation” of FAA preemption cases involving 
preemption challenges to state laws that regulate the arbitration process, as distinguished from 
the “first generation” of cases which involved state laws directed at invalidating the parties’ 
agreements to arbitrate.187  While the provisions for vacatur for improper disclosure under 
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2 have been recognized as raising the “specter 
of federal preemption,”188 the cases which have subjected that code section to preemption 
184
   9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2); ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc. (4th Cir. 1999) 173 F.3d 493, 499-
500; see also Montez v. Prudential Securities, Inc. (8th Cir. 2001) 260 F.3d 980, 983 (collecting cases and noting 
absence of consensus among circuit courts on definition of “evident partiality”).
185
   See, e.g., Ceriale v. AMCO Ins. Co., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 500 (vacating an award based on common law 
standard of arbitrator bias); Michael v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 925, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 
240 (finding that the vacation of an award for “corruption, fraud and undue means” can include an arbitrator’s 
failure to make disclosures as required by statute).
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   Alford Article, supra, p. 29.
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analysis have thus far determined that the FAA does not preempt California’s vacatur 
requirements.189  Those cases, however, have not dealt specifically with Section 1286.2(a)(6).  
Given the Azteca court’s application of Section 1286.2(a)(6) as discussed in Section 3(D), above, 
it is anticipated that it is only a matter of time before this code section is directly challenged in 
the courts.
Even if Section 1286.2(a)(6) is challenged on FAA preemption grounds, several 
authorities have noted that there is an “important caveat to the general rule of FAA preemption” 
as set forth in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Volt and Mastrobuono.190  The Supreme Court’s 
focus in those two cases was on the effect of FAA preemption on the choice of law provisions 
frequently included in commercial contracts.  “Plain and simple, in Volt the Supreme Court held 
that the intent of the parties to an arbitration agreement, as expressed in the contract between 
them, to conduct their arbitration under state law rules effectively trumps the preemptive effect 
of the FAA.”191  The governing state law selected by the parties per their agreement will control 
even when the selected state law “results in an arbitration conducted in a manner inconsistent 
with the substantive law of commercial arbitration set out in the FAA.”192
While FAA preemption is a much more difficult issue to predict with regard to such 
“back end” issues as confirmation, modification and vacatur of awards, because those issues 
concern the effectuation of the result of the arbitration “and thereby serve to effectively 
189
   See, Muao v. Grosvenor Props. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1085, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 (finding that the FAA did not 
preempt Section 1286.2’s procedures for reviewing arbitral awards); Siegel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (1998) 67 
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culminate enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate,”193 it is expected that FAA 
preemption of Section 1286.2(a)(6) is likely at least with respect to contracts involving interstate 
commerce where there is no choice-of-law provision subjecting the parties to arbitration in 
accordance with California law.
5. Conclusion
The stated goals of the New Ethics Rules are “to inform and protect participants in 
arbitration, and to promote public confidence in the arbitration process.”194  This is a laudable 
goal, especially since arbitration is a private process that is dependent on public acceptance.  The 
heart of the controversy concerning the New Ethics Rules seems to revolve around the practical 
inconvenience and cost burden associated with compliance.  It is submitted that such a burden 
goes with the privilege of being empowered to decide parties’ fates by determining the outcome 
of their disputes with binding finality and limited judicial review.  Because arbitration is no 
longer limited to the commercial disputes arising from the parties’ contracts and has been 
expanded to include claims that theretofore only could have been heard and decided in the 
courts, so too should the ethics rules governing neutral arbitrators also be expanded to include 
disclosures akin to what is required of judges.
While everyone agrees that some level of arbitrator disclosure is in order, there is hearty 
discord and debate on how much disclosure is necessary, whether can or should be legislated by 
state statutes and whether the remedy for improper disclosures should be mandatory vacatur.  
Arbitration reform by way of ethics is a phenomenon that has occurred first in California and 
will most likely be unsettled for many years while the judiciary, other states and respected 
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arbitration authorities weigh in on these issues.  Until that time, private arbitration in California 
will remain a hot bed of controversy and conflicting decisions which works against the stated 
purpose of promoting public confidence in the arbitration process.
